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From Muhammed and others to De Beer and others: striking
the balance between public health measures and human rights
during Covid-19 era in South Africa
Ebenezer Durojaye and Robert Doya Nanima
Faculty of Law, Dullah Omar Institute, The University of the Western Cape, Bellville,
South Africa
This article evaluates the approach by the South African Courts concerning
the constitutionality of the declaration of national disaster and the Covid-19
regulations. It sets the tone by evaluating the approach in Kenya in contrast
with the South Africa position. A look at the rising tensions between human
rights protection and public law informs this exercise. While Kenya uses a
precautionary approach to uphold the constitutionality of the Curfew order,
South Africa seems to oscillate between the proportionality and the rational-
ity test. A call for clarity in the Court’s reasoning on rationality is proposed.
1. Introduction
The world first got to know of coronavirus (Covid 19) in December 2019, when it
rampaged the Chinese city of Wuhan causing many deaths. On 30 January 2020,
the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the outbreak of COVID-19 to be
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. About two months later, on
11 March 2020 the WHO recognised it as a pandemic. As at 15 May 2020, over 4
million people had been infected, with over 300,000 deaths.1
The first reported case of Covid-19 in South Africa was made known on 5
March 2020, since then the pandemic has risen drastically with about 14,000
infected, 257 deaths and over 6000 recoveries as at 15 May 2020.2 Thereafter, the
government has adopted several measures to contain the pandemic. This has
enabled it to have an integrated and coordinated disaster management mechanism
that focuses on preventing and reducing the outbreak of the pandemic.
On 15 March 2020, the government declared a national state of disaster in
terms of the Disaster Management Act,3 necessitating a national lockdown.
Firstly, the government limited contact between persons who may be infected and
*Corresponding author. Email: rnanima@uwc.ac.za
1European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control COVID 19 situation update
worldwide (April 2020). <http/www.ecdc.europa/en/gec>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
According to the World Health Organisation, Covid-19 is ‘primarily transmitted from
symptomatic people to others who are in close contact through respiratory droplets, by
direct contact with infected persons, or by contact with contaminated objects and
surfaces’ See <https://bit.ly/2EJS18o>. Accessed 30 July 2020.
2Minster of Health Zweli Mkhize reports first case of Covid 19 <sacoronavirus.co.za>.
Accessed 22 June 2020.
3Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, Section 27.
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South African citizens.4 As a result, all non-essential travels out of the Republic
was prohibited.5 Also, all non-essential domestic travels, particularly by air, rail,
taxis and bus was discouraged.6 Secondly, the government sought to minimise the
risk of the spread of Covid-19 by limiting contact amongst groups of people.7
Effectively, the regulations prohibited gatherings of more than 100 people.8 All
upcoming mass celebrations were prohibited and schools closed.9
Thirdly, the government strengthened its surveillance and testing systems.10
This was done through the identification of isolation and quarantine sites in each
district and metro, and the improvement of capacity at all designated hospitals in
all provinces.11 The government also embarked on aggressive efforts toward
increasing the capacity of existing contact tracing processes.12
More importantly, the government recognised various socioeconomic chal-
lenges such as the safety of children, loss of income by small business owners
and informal traders, loss of jobs, and lack of adequate housing especially by the
vulnerable population, including those who are homeless.13 It undertook to pro-
vide food and cash transfer and other palliatives to identified communities.14
While the lockdown was for an initial period of 3weeks (25 March–16 April
2020), it was further extended to last until midnight on 30 April 2020. Thereafter,
the government announced that the lockdown would be relaxed by allowing fur-
ther activities to take place in phases. This has caused disquietude among some
members of the population. Thus, many have threatened court actions to challenge
the constitutionality of the lockdown. Two High Court decisions in Muhammed
Mohammed and others v The President of South Africa and others15 and Reyno
De Beer and others v The Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional
Affairs16 are some of the few concluded cases to determine the constitutionality of
the lockdown and the subsequent regulations in South Africa. It should be noted
that at the time of writing this article, the Pretoria High Court had granted the
4Statement by President C. Ramaphosa on measures to combat Covid-19 epidemic
(May 2020). <https://bit.ly/35x79PB>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
5Ibid.
6Government Gazette 43148, dated 25 March 2020, providing for the Disaster
Management Act (57/2002): Regulations made in terms of Section 27(2) by the
Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.
7Statement by President C. Ramaphosa on measures to combat Covid-19 epidemic






13Update by President C. Ramaphosa on measures to combat Covid-19 epidemic (May
2020). <https://bit.ly/2SBI29e>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
14SASSA provides food parcel relief (May 2020). <https://bit.ly/3b6xBkg>. Accessed
22 June 2020.
15Mohamed and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2020]
ZAGPPHC 120.
16Reyno De Beer and others v The Minister of Cooperative Governnance and
Traditional Affairs [2020] ZAGPPHC 184 (2 June 2020).
176 E. Durojaye and R. D. Nanima
Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal.17
This article seeks to evaluate the approach by the South African Courts in
dealing with the constitutionality of the declaration of national disaster and the
Covid-19 regulations. It sets the tone by giving the approach of the Courts in other
jurisdictions before engaging the South African position. Thereafter an evaluation
of the decisions in Muhammed and De Beer is done to show South Africa’s
approach. At its core, the article makes sense of how the courts in all jurisdictions
have dealt with three aspects. First, how they have balanced human rights and
Public Health, secondly; how they have identified possible tensions that may arise
in this balancing and thirdly; proposals on how to resolve them. By design, this
article visits two high court decisions from East Africa- Kenya to be exact. A
look at emerging jurisprudence shows that the reported cases from other East
African countries like Uganda reveal that most of the reported cases have not con-
tested the government’s restrictions but rather sought to seek an order to carry on
businesses like having corporate meetings.18 Kenya, however, has had litigation
that has contested the constitutionality of the lockdown restrictions and their
implementation. In principle, this is at par with the South African litigation that
concerns the constitutionality of the declaration of the state of disaster and the
regulations thereunder. To this end, the article evaluates the Kenyan decisions in
Law Society of Kenya v Inspector General of National Police Service19 and Joan
Akoth and another v Micheal Owuor Osodo and others.20 This creates a juxtapos-
ition of the position adopted by the South African courts. Muhammed and De
Beer. Before an evaluation of the Kenyan experience is done, the contribution
sets the scene on the balancing of rights and public health interventions.
2. Setting the scene: a balancing of rights and public health interventions
South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 provides for a Bill of Rights that is expected
to inform decisions by the courts.21 Besides, South Africa is a party to inter-
national human rights instruments that provide for various civil, political, socio-
economic and cultural rights.22 This includes recognition of thematic human
17The Minister of Cooperative Governnance and Traditional Affairs v Reyno De Beer
and others [2020] ZAGPPHC 280 (30 June 2020).
18See decisions available at <ulii.org>. Accessed 31 July 2020. These include Re:
British American Tobacco (Uganda) Limited [2020] UGHCCD 133, Re: Stanbic
Uganda Holdings Limited [2020] UGHCCD 134, Re: Uganda Institute of Banking and
Financial Services [2020] UGHCCD 152.
19Law Society of Kenya v Hillary Mutyambai Inspector General National Police
Service & 4 others; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights & 3 others
(Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR.
20Joan Akoth Ajuang & another v Michael Owuor Osodo the Chief Ukwala Location &
3 others; Law Society of Kenya & another [2020] eKLR .
21The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2.
22The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171
(ICCPR), The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
UNTS 3, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5, (1982).
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rights instruments that provide for the rights of religious groups, children, women,
immigrants and other marginalised individuals.23
Following the outbreak of the pandemic, South Africa alongside other coun-
tries has been called upon to avoid the suspension of the enjoyment of rights by
its organs, but rather ensure that the rights are enjoyed albeit in a limited man-
ner.24 To appreciate this concept in the context of decisions, there is a need look
at the bigger international picture concerning the balancing of rights.
Under international human rights law (IHlL), human rights may either be sub-
jected to limitations or derogations.25 This contribution takes a stand by design to
emphasise the context of limitations because (as will be shown) this formed the
conversation in Muhammed Mohammed and others. It will also be shown that in
De Beer, the emphasis was on the rationality test. Concerning the right to religion,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) engages limita-
tions to the rights or the use of derogations under the derogations’ clause.26
Concerning the right to religion and the consequential limitations, the subsequent
analysis is imperative. The ICCPR provides:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.27
Emerging jurisprudence has emanated from the Human Rights Committee dis-
tinguishes between the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief on the
one hand, and the freedom to manifest religion or belief on the other.28 In add-
ition, the jurisprudence does not allow any limitations whatsoever on the freedom
of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief
of one’s choice.29 However, the General Comment on the Right to religion allows
for restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief on two grounds.30
First, where the limitations are prescribed by law and secondly, where it is neces-
sary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights
23Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (2007) 2515 UNTS 3, Protocol
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa, Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo,
CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000) entered into force Nov. 25, 2005. See also African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49
(1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999.
24Human Rights Watch ‘Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response,’ <https://
bit.ly/34MRRGn>. Accessed 1 April 2020. See also Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (2020) ‘Statement on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
pandemic and economic, social and cultural rights’ E/C.12/2020/1.
25A Zidar ‘WHO International Health Regulations and human rights: from allusions to
inclusion’ (2015) 19(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 505–526, 506.
26The ICCPR (n 22).
27Ibid., Article 18.
28General Comment 24 on Article 18 of the ICCPR, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 3.
29Ibid., para 3.
30Ibid., para 8.
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and freedoms of others.31 In Victor Liven v Kazakhstan, the Human Rights
Committee reiterated two principles on the use of limitations under Article 18(3).
First, the limitations have to be interpreted strictly, within the prescribed purpose,
directly related to and proportionate to the specific predicated need. Secondly, the
interpretation should be against the backdrop of ensuring that the right to equality
and non-discrimination on all grounds specified in articles 2, 3 and 26.32 To this
end, where the limitation includes a criminal sanction like imprisonment or a fine,
the State has to show that this limitation is proportional to the legitimate purpose
it seeks to serve.33 The State should show the court that there is an objective
standard that the limitation has to surpass following a subjective evaluation of the
limitation and its purpose.
Another right that is closely related to the right to manifest one’s religion is
the right to freedom of expression.34 The restrictions on the enjoyment of this
right may be used to ensure that there is respect for the rights of others or to pro-
tect national security, public order, public health or morals.35 As such, the expres-
sion in the form of manifestation of one’s religion may be limited under the
ICCPR if it is provided for by law, and it is necessary for the respect of the rights
or reputations of others.36
In its General Comment 34, the Human Rights Committee states that Article
19(3) of the ICCPR requires specific conditions for the imposition of the restric-
tions thereunder; (1) strict conformity to the tests of necessity and proportionality,
(2) coupled with the purpose informing their prescription, and (3) directly related
to the specific purpose.37 The State has to justify such limitations to demonstrate
the necessity of the restrictive measures for a particular purpose.38
In addition to the ICCPR, the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Siracusa Principles) provide specific conditions on the limitation of rights during
emergencies.39 They speak to both interpretative principles about limitation
31Ibid.,, para 8. See the ICCPR (n 22), Article 18(3).
32Victor Liven v Kazakhstan CCPR Communication No. 2131/2012, para 9.3.
33Ibid., para 9.4.
34Articles 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 25 of the ICCPR expressly permit some form of
restriction or limitation. For instance, freedom from discrimination under article 2 of
the ICCPR, freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under article 7 of the
ICCPR may be limited. In addition, the right of children to special protection (article
24 of the ICCPR and article 3 of the CRC) and freedom from arbitrary interference
with home, family, correspondence or reputation privacy (article 17 of the ICCPR) may
also be limited.
35The ICCPR (n 22), Article 19.
36Ibid., Article 19(3).
37Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 on Article 19, CCPR/C/GC/34,
para 22.
38Ibid., para 28. In the Human Rights Committee Communication Mukong v Cameroon
458/1991, the HRC underscored that a detention will be considered arbitrary if it is
devoid of a legal basis, discriminatory, or completely disproportionate to the legitimate
aim to be achieved.
39Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985),
https://bit.ly/2VitFbH (accessed 4 April 2020).
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clauses40 and the use of derogations during a period of emergency.41 While the
Siracusa Principles contain 14 principles, this contribution emphasises those con-
cerning public health emergencies and interventions.42 According to the
Siracusa Principles:
Public health may be invoked as a ground for limiting certain rights in order to
allow a State to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the
population or individual members of the population. These measures must be
specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the sick
and injured.43
In addition the Siracusa Principles state:
Due regard shall be had to the International Health Regulations of the World
Health Organization.44
This is an indication that public health may be used to limit other rights
(including the right to religion) to deal with serious threats to the population for
preventive and treatment purposes. While this wording offers some key insights
on the limitations, the extent of the restrictions is not clearly stated. As such, one
is left wondering whether it is a subjective or objective assessment by a govern-
ment engaging the restrictions. It is argued that this leads one to apply the limita-
tions in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR based on a legitimate objective, strictly
necessary in a democratic society. Some scholars have argued that the State
should use the least restrictive and intrusive means available that is neither arbi-
trary, unreasonable, nor discriminatory.45 The questions of subjectivity or object-
ivity in the adopted approach still do arise.
In the wake of recent epidemics and pandemics like Ebola, Spanish flu, Avian
Flu, the use of restrictive public health measures has been the adopted norm by
various States.46 These drastic national measures affect the enjoyment of civil and
political rights like the right to freedom of movement and the right to life in the
context of livelihood. Most socio-economic rights are not spared like the right to
food and nutrition, access to health care, and education.
These public health interventions have led to an increase in domestic violence,
agitation over the enjoyment of personal rights like the right to manifesting one’s
religion and the freedom of expression. Other socio-economic bottlenecks like
high costs of living, unemployment and evictions also do arise. These challenges






45LO Gostin ‘When terrorism threatens health: how far are limitations on personal and
ecomonic liberties justified’ (2003) 55 Florida Law Review 1105–1170, 1105.
46S Diego, S Maxwell ‘Commentary: Limiting Rights and Freedoms in the Context of
Ebola and Other Public Health Emergencies: How the Principle of Reciprocity Can
Enrich the Application of the Siracusa Principles’ <https://bit.ly/2RNG714>. Accessed
4 April 2020.
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other rights and the continued application of public health measures.47 As
observed from some human rights principles stated above, states may be allowed
to take steps and measures to limit rights in order to address public health emer-
egcy. Howver, in doing this there is a need to strike the balance between the
measures taken and their implications for enjoyment of rights. It is thus instructive
to evaluate whether and probably how the Court dealt with these tensions that
arise from the use of limitations in the context of the right to religion.
3. An evaluation of Kenya’s approach
Following Kenya identification of its first case of Covid-19 on 13 March 2020, it
adopted a various measures to mitigate the spread of the pandemic. The main
measure was the imposition of a night curfew under the Public Order Act.48 Five
key aspects speak to the nature of the order. It applies to the entire territory of the
Republic of Application from 7:00 pm to 5:00 am from the 27 March 2020.49 It is
argued that this was a partial curfew subject to the specific hours. The order
restricted public gatherings, processions and movements during the period of the
curfew. The movement would ony be allowed where one was in possession of a
permit from a designated police officer.50 The group of persons that was
exempted from the restriction included service providers, personnel and workers
identified in the schedule to the Order.
Other measures included restrictions on travel from countries with cases of
Corona virus.51 Only Kenyan citizens and any foreigners with valid residence per-
mits will be allowed into the country as long as they quarantined in a government
designated quarantine facility or other facilities at their cost.52 The government
and businesses shifted to working remotely except for essential services.53 All
congressional meetings, gatherings were banned.54 At the time of passing the cur-
few order, Kenya had two cases of Covid-19.55 As at 4 August 2020, Kenya’s
positive identifation of Covid-19 cases stood at 22,597 confirmed cases with 382
deaths.56 The subsequent section evaluates the judicial approach to the constitu-
tionality and implementation of the Covid-19 Curfew Order.
47S Diego, S Maxwell ‘Commentary: Limiting Rights and Freedoms in the Context of
Ebola and Other Public Health Emergencies: How the Principle of Reciprocity Can
Enrich the Application of the Siracusa Principles’ <https://bit.ly/2RNG714>. Accessed
4 April 2020.
48This was referred to as the Public Order (State Curfew) Order, Legal Notice No. 36
of 2020.
49Ibid., Rules 2 and 3. At the writing of this article the order had been extended for an
additional 30 days from 27 July 2020. See <https://bit.ly/3i62ZmY>. Accessed 5
August 2020.
50Ibid., Rules 4 and 5.





56World Health Organisation, Dashboard Kenya Covid-19 <https://bit.ly/39XMiaH>.
Accessed 5 August 2020.
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3.1. Law society of Kenya v inspector general of national police service
and others
In the case of Law Society of Kenya v Inspector General of National Police
Service and Others (LSK), the petitioner sought an order to nullify the Curfew
Order passed under the Public Order Act (POA) on the ground that it was uncon-
stitutional as far as the enabling act dealt with fighting crime other than dealing
with emergencies. It was argued that the emergencies were provided for in the
Public Health Act (PHA) and any order for a curfew to deal with the pandemic
had to be enacted under the provisions of this law. This contribution emphasises
on the court’s reasoning on the constitutionality of the curfew on the one hand
and the constitutionality of the implementation of the order on the other hand.
In the resolution of the issue on the constitutionality of the Curfew Order, the
Court believed that the PHA was duly mandated to be used in the management of
emergencies but it did not operate in isolation.57 It drew attention to section 16 of
the PHA that allowed the application of other laws in the implementation of the
law provided they were consistent with it. As such, as long as the application of
the POA did not conflict with the provisions of the PHA, the former would com-
plement the application of the latter. While this solved the problem of the consti-
tutionality of the order, it did not solve the problem of its implementation that
was marred with various human rights violations by the law enforcement officers.
The Court was alive to the principle that the object of the curfew order sought
to achieve was not measurable.58 This was informed by the absence of national
data and statistics that the country would use to inform its decision. If anything
the decision to institute a curfew was due to the data and statistics from the World
Health Organisation (WHO) and the other countries that had been rampaged by
the coronavirus.59 The Court argued despite the absence of national statistics, nei-
ther did the respondents explain the rationale for the curfew nor the petitioners
seek an interference with the discretion of the petitioner in implementing the cur-
few.60 On this basis, the Court opted for a precautionary rule in light of the deadly
effects of Covid-19 and the lack of national statistics in Kenya at the time of
reporting the case.
The Court reiterated the precautionary rule that stated in instances of emer-
gency, it is the duty of the State to take protective measures without having to
wait for the reality and seriousness of these risks to be fully demonstrated or man-
ifested. As this approach takes into account the actual risk to public health espe-
cially where there is uncertainty concerning the existence or extent of risks to the
health of consumers.61 This is an indication that the weight of the decision lies on
the discretion of the Court upon an evaluation of the facts. The Court reiterated
that the precautionary approach is important as it offers insights into the use of
primary prevention in public health practice.62 It appears that in the exercise of
57LSK, para 112.
58LSK, para 129.
59Coronavirus <https://bit.ly/2EJS18o>. Accessed 30 July 2020.
60LSK, para 129.
61LSK, para 130. See also Republic v Minister and 3 others Exparte Langat and 27
Others (Exparte Langat) [2018] eKLR, para 126, 128.
62LSK, para 131; Exparte Langat para 129.
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the precautionary principle there is need to ensure that the restrictive measures
that are identified are both objective and non-discriminatory. Based on the precau-
tionary principle, the Court found no fault on the part of the government for
enforcing the precautionary and restrictive measures to mitigate the spread of the
coronavirus. It however, advised that the curfew order required retooling and
remodelling to achieve the objective of ensuring public health other than fight-
ing crime.63
Before moving away from this case, the Court’s approach to balancing human
rights and public health, dealing with possible tension that arose and engaging the
possible solutions; needs to be hinted on. Concerning the balancing of human
rights and public health, it is argued that the Court validated the use of the POA
as the parent act that informed the enactment of the Curfew Order as a comple-
mentary measure to the application of the PHA on matters of emergencies.
The Court identified various tensions in the balancing of the rights and issues
of public health. This included a balancing of the literal rule and the purposive
rule of statutory interpretation in addressing the constitutionality of a law; the ten-
sion between a constitutionally or statutorily sound law and its illegal implementa-
tion and balancing between the proportionality and the precautionary rule. It is
clear from the foregoing that in the resolution of the tensions, the Court examined
the constitutionality of the law establishing the curfew as informed by rules of
statutory interpretation, and had recourse to a precautionary approach in the wake
of a disastrous emergency. Besides, the Court called for public health measures to
be practically applied to avoid excesses or abuses of the rights of an individual.
3.2. Joan Akoth Ajuang and another v Micheal Owuor Osodo and others
In a similar case of Joan Akoth Ajuang and another v Micheal Owuor Osodo and
Others (Okoth), the petitioners contested the rushed burial of their loved one by
the respondents who were sub-government and government officers. They argued
that they rushed the burial without according the deceased the cultural norms of
the Luo community in Kenya. The petitioners argued that deceased had a right to
human dignity, and the surviving relative too, had a right to enjoy their culture
and this extended to exercising their cultural norms and beliefs concerning the
burial and sendoff of the deceased.
The petitioner sought orders that the Court finds that the respondents; (1) vio-
lated the right to the human dignity of the deceased under the Luo culture,
national and international law; (2) the deceased be exhumed, an autopsy carried
out to ascertain the cause of death and reburied- all at the cost of the Ministry on
health and (3) the cost to be borne by the respondents.64
The Court conceptualised the right to human dignity of a deceased by giving
examples where the deceased’s wishes were respected in aspects like testamentary
disposition. It hastened to add that while a deceased may not have any proprietary
rights, he does not cease to be a human upon death.65 to this end, the deceased
63LSK, para 132–133.
64Joan Akoth Ajuang and another v Micheal Owuor Osodo and Others Siaya High
Court Constitutional Petition 1 of 2020, para 1(a)-(f).
65Okoth, para 173.
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 183
remained a human being who was entitled to human dignity despite his passing.66
Consequently, the surviving relatives retained the right to participate in their cul-
ture as underscored in articles 44(1) and (2) of the Constitution. The Court reiter-
ated the deceased’s right to a linguistic group with a right to enjoy culture, use a
language and to form, join and maintain the cultural and linguistic association
with others.67
The other question was whether these rights would be enjoyed during the
Covid-19 outbreak. The Court established that the WHO Guidelines on the
Management and Handling of Dead Bodies allowed a family and friends to view
the body following their customs.68 Besides, a person preparing the deceased had
to wear gloves to avoid physical contact and any clothes used during the prepar-
ation had to be removed and washed immediately.69 It was also established that a
minimum number of persons would be involved and would observe at a minimum
distance of 1 metre from the body.70 It was further established that the Public
Health (Prevention, Control and Suppression of Covid-19) Rules,71 required bur-
ial between the hours of 0900 am and 1500 pm with an attendance of not more
than 15 persons.72 An evaluation of the national and WHO regulations is an indi-
cation that the rushed burial of the deceased at night in a shallow grave was not
saved by the WHO regulations or the national Covid-19 Rules. The extent to
which the court would grant the remedies now, we turn.
The Court still used a precautionary approach as laid out in Exparte Langat
and discussed above. While it recognised the deceased’s right to human dignity
and the surviving relatives’ right to culture, it reiterated the dangers in exhuming
the deceased, conducting an autopsy and having a decent burial. The Court called
for the use of precaution especially where there was uncertainty concerning the
health risks of some actions.73
It is also clear from the foregoing case that the Court balanced the constitu-
tional rights of the deceased and the living and public health by establishing the
existence of the right to the human dignity of the deceased and the right to culture
and evaluating the extent of their enjoyment under the WHO Guidelines and the
national Covid-19 Rules. The tensions that are evident in the balancing these
rights related to the extent of enjoyment of the right, the extent of enjoyment of
the remedy in line with the dangers in exhuming the deceased. The resolution
remains in the application of the precautionary principle to avert unknown dan-
gers of Covid-19 and the deceased. It is now imperative to establish in light of







71Public Health (Prevention, Control and Suppression of Covid-19) Rules, Legal Notice
49 of 2020, see also Okoth, para 194.
72Public Health (Prevention, Control and Suppression of Covid-19) Rules, Legal Notice
49 of 2020, Rule 8. Okoth, para 194.
73Okoth, para 201, 248, 259 and 278.
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4. An evaluation of South Africa’s approach
4.1. Muhammed v President of South Africa
The Applicants, who are devout Muslims, together with others brought an urgent
application before the High Court in Pretoria to challenge the constitutionality of
some of the Regulations made under the Disaster Management Act, which tend to
limit some of their fundamental rights. They alleged that the Regulations have
prevented them from exercising their religious life, including their daily prayers.
They also claimed that their rights to liberty, dignity and freedom of association
are impugned by the Regulations. The Applicants claimed that daily prayers are
important tenets of Islam and that inability to congregate for prayers would lead
to sin thereby undermining their right to religion. It was further alleged that the
Regulations seemed to criminalise an otherwise daily compulsory religious prac-
tice thereby forcing them to make a ‘Hobson’s choice’74 between disobeying
what they regard as a fundamental tenet of their belief’ and adhering to the law.75
The Applicants claimed that this case goes beyond the right to association as
guaranteed in section 31 of the South African Constitution, but intercepts with
other rights such as the right to practice one’s religion, the right to freedom of
association, freedom of movement, freedom, the right to life and the right to dig-
nity.76 They further claimed that since the government can grant certain excep-
tions for some activities, it should be able to do the same for purposes of
congregational worship as well.
The Applicants proposed that prayers should be allowed in mosques subject to
a limited number of people. They therefore, asked that Regulation 11B(i) and (ii),
read with the definition of the word ‘gathering’ in the Regulations issued under
Section 27 of the Disaster Management Act was too broad and excessive, a threat
to human rights and therefore be declared unconstitutional. The Applicants further
asked for an order directing the Minister in charge to make an exception for
Muslims to congregate for prayers subject to supervision.
In response to the Applicants, the Respondents claimed that the measures
taken by the government to limit the enjoyment of rights were necessary and
under section 36 of the Constitution, They noted that in a public health emergency
as evidenced by the devastating effects of Covid-19, the Court must strike the bal-
ance between allowing free movement and assembly with the inherent danger of
being exposed to the pandemic.
In its judgement, the Court held that the Regulations made subject to the pro-
vision of the Disaster Management Act were aimed at ensuring that the govern-
ment minimize the devastating impact of Covid-19 on the lives of the people.
While some of the measures taken might seem burdensome and inconvenient for
the people, they remain the most viable options open to the government in the
face of threats to health and lives posed by the pandemic. While the Court noted
that some of the measures taken by the government may indeed interfere with the
human rights of the people, this interference is justified under section 36 of the
74The so-called ‘take it or leave it’ principle.
75For instance; praying in congregation at mosque. In this they admit that their view is
not the majority view of Muslims.
76These rights are all guaranteed in the Constitution 1996’s Bill of Rights.
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Constitution. According to the Court, given the danger posed by the pandemic to
lives and health of the people ‘the regulations must strike a delicate balance
between limiting social contact and possibly allowing the virus to spread on the
one hand and meeting the short- and long-terms needs of people within South
Africa on the other’.77 In achieving this balance, the Court referred to the
Constitutional Court’s decision in Home Affairs v NICRO where it was affirmed
that the limitation analysis:
[C]alls for a different enquiry to that conducted when factual disputes have to
be resolved. In a justification analysis facts and policy are often intertwined.
There may for instance be cases where the concerns to which the legislation is
addressed are subjective and not capable of proof as objective facts. A
legislative choice is not always subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be
based on reasonable inferences unsupported by empirical data.78
On this basis, the Court held that the limitations on rights imposed by the
Regulations are reasonable and justifiable under the Constitution. The Court fur-
ther held that in the spirit of Ubuntu (humanness), which requires that we must
consider the interests of others much as ours, the Applicants ought to be more
concerned with the likely consequences of their actions and requests for the popu-
lation as a whole. The Court affirmed that allowing for congregational prayers at
this crucial time would not be in the interest of the public. It noted that in the spi-
rit of Ubuntu, virtually everyone in the country has been called upon to make one
sacrifice or another to stem the spread of the pandemic.79 Therefore, the
Applicants are no exception and could not claim to have been more inconven-
ienced than others.
In rejecting the Applicants’ application, the Court reasoned that the steps taken
by the government under the Regulations and the Disaster Management Act were
necessary and important in stemming the spread of Covid-19. Therefore, they are
justifiable and reasonable in the circumstances and in accordance with the
Constitution. It suffices to note that in balancing the rights of the applicants and
the public health interventions, the Court correctly identified the right to freedom
of religion. However, for the sake of mitigating the spread of the pandemic, the
court uses the limitation clause to find that the regulations were reasonable and
justified in ensuring that the right to religion had to be limited. The tension was
evident in the enjoyment of the right to religion and the need to ensure public
health. The resolution was in the use of the limitation clause to find that the limi-
tation was rationally connected to the purpose they sought to achieve.
4.2. De Beer and others v minister of cooperative governance and
traditional affairs
This application was brought for a declaration that the national state of
disaster, the promulgated regulations be declared unconstitutional, unlawful
77Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC), para 37.
78Ibid.
79Ibid. para 75.
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and invalid.80 In the alternative, the applicants also sought an order that all
gatherings be declared lawful and allowed subject to certain conditions.81
They further sought an order that all businesses, services and shops be
allowed to operate subject to reasonable precautions like using masks, gloves
and sanitisers.82 It should be noted that while in Muhammed, the applicants
recognised the rationality and reasonableness in the use of the Covid-19
Regulations, they sought an exception to the application of the rules. In De
Beer, the applicant contested the rationality and reasonability of the Covid-19
regulations arguing that the same was invalid.83 Also, in Muhammed, the
judge disagreed with the applicants’ assertion that the regulations were reason-
able and justified and stated that it was the duty of every good meaning
South African to make sacrifices for the greater good.84 Just like in LSK, the
main issues revolved around the constitutionality of the lockdown on one
hand and its implementation on the other hand. The issues were whether (1)
the declaration of the national state of disaster was unconstitutional, (2)
whether the regulations were unconstitutional.
The court found that the procedure to be followed before a declaration was
made required that the national disaster management centre had an obligation to
assess the magnitude and severity of the disaster.85 This would be followed by the
publication of the declaration of the National State of Disaster by notice in the
gazette.86 The Court found that the Minister’s reliance on the magnitude and
severity of the disaster, the declaration of the outbreak as a pandemic by the
World Health Organisation informed the rational declaration of the state of disas-
ter. Other reasons that the Court relied on included the classification of the out-
break as a pandemic by one Dr Tau, the need to align existing measures by
government departments and the recognition of existing special circumstances
calling for the making of this declaration.87 The Court reiterated that while the
declaration of the state of disaster was constitutionally valid, it gave the Minister
lots of powers to make regulations to extensively affect the rights of people.88
The point of departure from Kenya’s precautionary approach was in the use of
the rationality approach. The Court found that the rationality test evaluated the
relationships between the means employed and whether it was rationally con-
nected to the outcome or the achieved purpose.89 The Court clarified that the
rationality test was not about what other means would be used to arrive and the
desired means but rather whether the current means used was rationally connected
80Reyno Da Wid De Beer and two Others v the Minister of Cooperative Governance
and Traditional Affairs (De Beer) Gauteng High Court Constitutional Application
21542 of 2020, para 3.1.
81De Beer, para 3.1.
82De Beer, para 3.1.
83De Beer, paras 3.5–3.6.
84Muhammed, paras 75, 77.
85De Beer, para 4.1–4.6.
86De Beer, para 4.7.
87De Beer, para 4.10.
88De Beer, para 4.13.
89De Beer, para 6.2–6.4.
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to the purpose for which the power was conferred. The Court then engaged a sub-
jective evaluation of each regulation and whether it was rational in achieving the
desired outcome.
The subjective evaluation established that number of regulations did not meet
the rationality test. The court gave an example of the irrationality and the unrea-
sonableness in restricting movement yet upon the demise of a Covid-19 subject,
the same regulations allowed up to 50 people from any part of the country to
attend the burial of the deceased.90 It was argued that this led to the striping of the
human dignity of erstwhile hardworking people who engaged with a few people
daily in a bid to fend for their families.91 The only provisions, where rationality
was linked to the purpose related to the closure of educational institutions, the
prohibition against evictions, initiation practices and the closure of night clubs
and fitness centres.92
The government has appealed against this judgment and it will be interesting
to know the outcome of the appeal. While some commentators have hailed the
decision as significant, others have cautioned about its likely implications as it
could amount to judicial overreach.93
Moreover, it is possible for the measures adopted to be reasonable but their
implementation may be excessive and injurious to the people. There have been
instances, where security agents charged with implementing the lockdown
resorted to excessive use of force to ensure compliance.94 Also, States are begin-
ning to use technology and other methods as a form of contact tracing for Covid-
19, thereby infringing the right to privacy.95 In some countries, new laws are to
be considered to give more powers to the government about containing future
pandemics. In Nigeria, a Bill before the legislature known as the ‘Infectious
Diseases Control Bill’ includes provisions that will allow the government to for-
cibly vaccinate individuals and quarantine anyone suspected to have contracted an
infectious disease.96
90De Beer, para 7.1–7.2.
91De Beer, paras 7.2–7.4, 7.9, 7.11 to 7.12. As such.
92De Beer, para 7.14. Save for Regulations 36, 38, 39 (2)(d) and (e) and 41, the rest of
the regulations were declared unconstitutional. The declaration of invalidity was
suspended for such a time until the Minister reviewed, amended and published the
regulations in the Gazette. See para 9.
93See for instance, P De Vos ‘Lockdown regulation judgment is flawed, but so is
government’s “means justifies the ends” defence’ Daily Marverick 4 June 2020
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-06-04-lockdown-regulation-
judgment-is-flawed-but-so-is-governments-means-justifies-the-ends-defence>. Accessed
22 June 2020. see also, P Balthazar ‘A disturbing example of judicial overreach’ Daily
Maverick 3 June 2020 <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-06-03-a-
disturbing-example-of-judicial-overreach/>. Accessed 18 June 2020.
94K Koko, ‘Metro cop, security guard arrested after Vosloorus man killed in lockdown
shooting’ The Star Newspaper (March 30, 2020). <http//www.iol.co.za>. Accessed 22
June 2020.
95The World Embraces Contact-Tracing Technology to Fight Covid-19 (May 2020).
<https://bloom.bg/3cKugsT>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
96See J. Kwen, ‘Why criticism swells around Infectious Diseases Control Bill’ May
Business Day Newspaper 10 My 2020. See also Infectious Diseases Bill conceived in
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Commentators have cautioned that measures being adopted by States to curb
the spread of Covid-19 should be viewed with caution as they are susceptible to
abuse.97 In a more radical view, others have argued that under no circumstance
should human rights be compromised for the sake of protecting public health.98
Indeed, some international and regional human rights bodies have expressed con-
cerns with the measures being adopted by States to curb the spread of the pan-
demic. For instance, the CESCR has warned that efforts by States to combat
Covid 19 must not undermine the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights.99 Also, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has noted that while meas-
ures such as lockdown may be expedient in curbing the spread of Covid-19, their
application must be consistent with human rights guaranteed in the ACHPR.100 It
is interesting to note that the Court never made any reference to international
norms on this issue, despite the provision of the Constitution, which requires the
courts to consider international law while interpreting the Bill of Rights.101
If there is no check on the use of powers to curtail the pandemic, this might
result in an authoritarian executive with wide powers capable of threatening the
enjoyment of human rights. Such a situation requires a vigilant and vibrant judi-
ciary to ensure that people’s rights are not trampled upon with impunity all in the
name of containing a public health emergency. As rightly observed by the US
Supreme Court in Jacobson case, the application of adopted measures by the State
to limit rights must not lead to injustice, oppression or absurd consequences.102
5. Tension between public health and human rights
All the cases discussed here clearly bring to the fore again the potential tension
that arises from a balancing of public health responses to a pandemic on one hand
and enjoyment of human rights on the other. This tension has existed for many
years and requires a delicate balance.103 It is argued that public health policies
public interest – Reps … to be subjected to public hearing before final passage (May
2020). <https://www.nils.gov.ng/news/view/485>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
97F Vicente and R Benıtez ‘Hercules Leaves (But Does Not Abandon) the Forum of
Principle: Courts, Judicial Review, and COVID-19’ International Journal of
Constitutional Law Blog <http://www.iconnectblog.com/hercules-leaves-but-does-not-
abandon-the-forum-of-principle-courts-judicial-review-and-covid-19/>. Accessed 22
June 2020.
98GJ Annas ‘Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public health and Liberty in the 21st Century’
(2003) 3(5) Health Matrix 33–56, 33.
99Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the coronavirus
disease (COVID-19) pandemic and economic, social and cultural rights, E/C.12/2020/1
6 April 2020.
100African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Press Statement on human
rights based effective response to the novel COVID-19 virus in Africa <https://www.
achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=483>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
101Constitution (n 21), Section 39.
102Anonymous ‘Toward a Twenty-First Century Jacobson v Massachusetts’ (2008)
121(7) Harvard Law Review 1820–1841, 1820.
103REG Upshur ‘Principles for the justification of public health intervention’ (2002)
93(2) Canadian Journal of Public Health 101–103 generally.
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and actions should always be subjected to scrutiny, as they are potential threats to
the enjoyment of rights.104 This is because public health aims to protect the com-
munity or public at the expense of safeguarding individuals’ rights. An outbreak
of epidemics and pandemics poses grave threats to the lives and well-being of
the people.
The right to health is guaranteed in many international and regional human
rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights105 and the ACHPR.106 The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) in General Comment 14 has noted that the enjoyment
of the right to health is dependent on other rights such as privacy, liberty, dignity,
non-discrimination and life.107 The Committee further notes that States are obli-
gated to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health. This requires States to
restrain from interfering with the enjoyment of these rights, ensure that third par-
ties do not interfere with the enjoyment of this right and adopt legislative and
other measures towards the realisation of the right. As part of the obligations of
States to realise the right to health, the Committee notes that States must take
effective measures to address the epidemic and infectious diseases.108
A public health emergency such as Covid-19 poses serious threats to the peo-
ple and can undermine not only the enjoyment of the right to health but also lead
to catastrophic consequences for society. Thus, addressing it requires decisive
measures from the government, which may tend to limit the enjoyment of one’s
fundamental rights.109 This is sometimes justified by the principle of social com-
pact or paramount necessity. For instance, in Jacobson v Massachusetts,110 the
conviction of Jacobson for refusing vaccination against smallpox was upheld on
the basis that a State has the right to protect itself against an epidemic that threat-
ens the safety of its members. Jacobson’s argument that his right to liberty would
be violated if forcibly vaccinated was rejected by the Court based on para-
mount necessity.
In recent times, the limitation of rights in times of public emergency has been
recognized in human rights instruments such as article 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).111 More importantly, the
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Siracusa Principles)112 have
104JM Mann, S Gruskin and GJ Annas (eds) Health and Human Rights.: A reader
(Routledge, New York, 1999), pp. 11–18.
105International covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 993 UNTS 3,
Article 12.
106African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 22 (11 July 1990)
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), Article 16.
107CESCR General Comment No. 14: The right to Highest Attainable Standard of
health (Art. 12), CESCR Document E/C. 12/2000/4 (May 2000). <https://bit.ly/
3e0hp6f>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
108Ibid., para 16.
109See LO Gostin ‘Public Health Law: Power, duty, Restraint’ (University of California
Press and Milbank memorial Fund 2000), 21.
110Jacobson v Massachusetts 197US 11 (1905) SC.
111The ICCPR, (n 22).
112Siracusa Principles (n 39).
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been adopted to deal specifically with limitation and derogation of rights. The
limitation of rights is permitted where it is ‘… in accordance with the law; based
on a legitimate objective; strictly necessary in a democratic society; the least
restrictive and intrusive means available; and not arbitrary, unreasonable, or
discriminatory’.113
Furthermore, the Siracusa Principles advise on the need to balance human
rights and public health restrictions. In principle, public health interventions may
be adopted to limit certain rights to enable a State to contain threats to the health
of the population, prevent disease or injury and provide care for the sick and the
injured.114 As such, an application of the Siracusa Principles aids the balancing of
restrictions and human rights in the containment of a pandemic.
In all the cases, the tensions are between ensuring human dignity and other
constitutional rights on one hand, and public health on the other. Kenya
approaches the balancing of human rights and public health by using a precaution-
ary approach. This limits the court’s evaluation engagement of solution that offer
adequate remedies to human rights violations. For instance in LSK, the court is
greatly concerning with qualifying the curfew order, while in Joan Okoth, it
empathises with the human rights violations to human dignity and culture but
engages caution that defeats the enjoyment of the culture through ordering burial
according to the Luo custom.
In South Africa, there is an identified trend in the engagement with the ten-
sions that arise. In the Mohammed case, the tension which the Court addresses the
right to exercise one’s liberty and religion in the face of the surging Covid 19
pandemic. In a bid to strike a balance between allowing the applicants to exercise
their right to religion and the implications of this for the applicants and public at
large, it finds that the right has to be limited to avert the spread of the coronavirus.
This trend changes in the De Beer Case where the Court finds fault in the engage-
ment of the rationality test, leading to a finding of constitutional invalidity for
various regulations.
Besides the change in trend is also evident in the Court findings on the pres-
ence or absence of justifications. In Muhammed, the Court justifies the imposition
of the lockdown as a means to curb the spread of Covid-19. The transition to the
findings that the lockdown undermines human rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, is after the evaluation of the regulations over time. It is clear that
subject to the rationality test, various regulations do not pass the constitutional
muster for want of rationality and reasonability.
As such, De Beer presents a shift from Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO
which is followed in Muhammed. For purposes of context, In Minister of Home
Affairs v NICRO, the Court stated:
A legislative choice is not always subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be
based on reasonable inferences unsupported by empirical data. When policy is
in issue it may not be possible to prove that a policy directed to a particular
concern will be effective. It does not necessarily flow from this, however, that
the policy is not reasonable and justifiable. If the concerns are of sufficient
113Ibid.
114Ibid. Principle 25.
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importance, the risks associated with them sufficiently high, and there is
sufficient connection between means and ends, that may.115
In that case, the Constitutional Court did emphasise that in justifying the limi-
tation of rights, the party relying on section 36 must lay all materials facts and
policy documents before the court to assist it in coming to an informed decision
as to the legality of the limitation. However, it noted that in some situations, it
might be impossible for parties to place all materials facts before the court. It
added that in such a situation it would still be ‘able to uphold a claim of justifica-
tion based on common sense and judicial knowledge’.116 The Court admitted that
the ultimate limitation of rights analysis requires balancing to be made. In this
regard, the Constitutional Court noted:
In this process, different and sometimes conflicting interests and values may
have to be taken into account. Context is all important and sufficient material
should always be placed before a court dealing with such matters to enable it to
weigh up and evaluate the competing values and interests in their
proper context.117
In adopting the position of the Constitutional Court in the NICRO case, the
Court suggests that the measures adopted by the government in response to
COVID-19 are essential to contain the pandemic although they limit the enjoy-
ments of rights.
The use of a case by case basis to evaluate the effectiveness of measures
adopted by the government to limit human rights is taken in De Beer, where an
evaluation of the regulations presents a finding on the extent of rationality. It is
for this reason that in De Beer, the Court upholds the challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the lockdown imposed by the government in the wake of COVID-19
pandemic. It is argued that the finding that some of the regulations adopted in fur-
therance of the state of emergency were unconstitutional and unlawful. In declar-
ing the regulations permitting the lockdown unconstitutional, the Court noted that
the measures were too stringent, interfered with the enjoyment of rights and could
not be said to be proportionate.118 According to the Court,
The regulations promulgated in respect of Levels 4 and 3 in terms of the
Section 27(2) of the Disaster Management Act by the Minister in a substantial
number of instances are not rationally connected to the objectives of slowing
the rate of infection or limiting the spread thereof.119
While on its face this decision seems progressive, it is still argued that the
Court’s reasoning is somewhat problematic. The Court, without proper
115Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-




118De Beer and Others v Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
(21542/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 184 (2 June 2020).
119Ibid. para 9.3
192 E. Durojaye and R. D. Nanima
explanation or analysis, declared some of the regulations unconstitutional. It is
debatable for the Court to hold that there is no rational connection between the
measures adopted by the government and the spread of COVID-19. It is on record
that the restriction of movement using lockdowns has been adopted in most parts
of the world as a vital tool to contain the pandemic and flatten the curve. Indeed,
the World Health Organisation has affirmed the effectiveness of lockdown in
slowing the spread of COVID-19.120
In addition, the High Court of Pretoria granted the Minister of Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal (the COGTA case).121 The leave to appeal was narrowed down to the
‘blanket’ declarations of invalidity.122 This refered to declaration of invalidity of
the regulations promulgated in terms of section 27(2) of the Disaster Management
Act 57 of 2002 which have not been expressly identified in the judgment in De
Beer.123 It is argued that following the tenor of the Court in De Beer, It is highly
possible that the Supreme Court of Appeal will evaluate the bounds of both the
rationality test and the proportionality test under section 36 of the Constitution
1996. It is interesting that the Court noted that other than the generalised grounds
that Minister relied on for leave to appeal, there was no attack on the findings of
irrationality concerning individual regulations.124 While the Court granted the
Minister leave to appeal, it advised that the Minister was still able to amend,
review and publish the regulations. However, the recent publication of the level 3
Guidelines might have cured some of the defects in the level 4 guidelines as the
country was opened up to more economic activities.
7. Conclusion
While Kenya takes on a precautionary test, South Africa’s jurisprudence seems to
take on the rationality test- a practice that is evolving in its jurisprudence. This
will be informed by the Supreme Court of the Appeal’s decision in COGTA. In
the interim, the use of the rationality test unpacks the context of the regulations
concerning the link between the rationale and the object sought. The exercise of
the State’s powers to contain a pandemic will always raise concerns. A State’s
decisive measures to save lives and curb the spread of a pandemic have to be
weighed against an individuals’ rights. An attempt to strike this balance is not
always an easy task. Notwithstanding, the court as the last hope for disadvantaged
groups must retain its independence and role as a watchdog of the other arms of
government. Where the measures adopted by a State are reasonable and justifi-
able, it might not be expedient for the court to interfere. However, excessive
120The Guardian ‘Coronavirus: WHO warns against further lifting of lockdown in
England <://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/14/who-cautions-against-further-
lifting-lockdown-england>. Accessed 22 June 2020.
121The Minister of Cooperative Governnance and Traditional Affairs v Reyno De Beer
and others [2020] ZAGPPHC 280 (30 June 2020).
122Ibid., para 11.
123Ibid., para 12.
124COGTA, para 6.2. The regulations expressly mentioned in paragraphs 7.1–7.10 of the
De Beer case were regulations 33(1)(e), 34, 35(1), 35(3), 39(2)(e), 39(2)(m) and 48(2).
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 193
implementation measures that threaten individuals’ rights, make it prudent for the
court to act. Moreover, the legislature must remain vigilant in playing oversight
role over the executive to prevent the executive from becoming a ‘monster.’ It is
safe to state that where the Court engages a rationality test, it ought to give spe-
cific reasons for holding that a particular regulation is irrational, especially in the
wake of the fact that is known globally that social distancing sanitation mitigates
the spread of the coronavirus.
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